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PREFACE 
In this period of disillusion with government's ability to anticipate important policy problems, 
the creation of the Commission demonstrates that the legislative process can foresee policy 
issues of widespread importance and impact to the people of California, address those issues 
in a timely and deliberative manner and involve a diverse group of Californians in the govern-
mental process. 
A full thirteen years after its passage, the Commission recognizes the intense public 
sentiment which continues to surround Proposition 13; One of the most frequently heard 
refrains from Commission observers was an amazement that the Senate, a body of elected 
officials, would even put a study of Proposition 13 on the public agenda. The Senate's 
willingness to reexamine the property tax system established by Proposition 13 is a measure 
of its public policy co:inmitment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue was established by Senate Resolution 
42 (authored by State Senator Gary K. Hart), enacted by the Senate on March 15, 1990. Ap-
pointment of the Commission membership was completed by the Senate Rules Committee on 
June 13, 1990. On January 18, 1991, the Senate enacted Senate Resolution 8 (Hart), extend-
ing the Commission's tenure until June 30, 1991. 
Appendix A contains copies of Senate Resolutions 42 and 8. Appendix B contains a roster of 
Commissioners and their respective affiliations at the t;ime of Senate Rules Committee ap-
pointment. 
The Commission adopted a monthly meeting schedule. Commission meeting were structured 
as roundtable briefings at which tax experts, state officials, legislative staff, academic 
scholars, local government representatives and citizen organizations were invited to make 
presentations to the Commission and spend the day in active dialogue with Commissioners 
and other presenters. Prior to each meeting, Commissioners were supplied with extensive 
background readings. 
Appendix C contains a schedule of Commission meetings and topics. Appendix D contains a 
roster of individuals who made presentations to the Commission. 
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CHAPTER I: 
COMMISSION RECOMMEJ.VDATIONS 
The Commission finds that the way property is assessed 
under Article XIIIA of the California Constitution has 
generated substantial inequities for property taxpayers. 
Under Article XIIIA, property in California is reassessed to fair 
market value only upon sale (or in the event of new construction). 
During the intervening years between sales, the property can be 
reassessed upwards by a maximum of two percent each year. 
Assessing property on the basis of acquisition value rather than 
market value produces side-by-side inequities such that taxpayers 
with identical properties may pay different property taxes due 
solely to the date the property was purchased. 
The Commission further notes that over time the property tax as-
sessment system does not self-correct or equalize the tax burden 
among taxpayers in any orderly, systematic way. In fact, dis pari-
ties have widened over time and will continue to widen so long as 
property values rise faster than the two percent annual reap-
praisal cap. 
The Commission does recognize that the two percent reassess-
ment cap has two beneficial, and noteworthy, outcomes. One, 
owners of property are afforded a measure of certainty in antici-
pating future property tax bills. Every property owner knows that 
his or her property tax bill cannot rise more than two percent per 
year for as long as he or she owns the property. 
The second important benefit is that the property tax system does 
not tax unrealized capital gains (beyond the limitation of the two 
percent cap). In effect, the property tax system has been disen-
gaged, for the most part, from the volatility of California's real 
estate market. Property owners enjoy a stable tax levy over the 
course of property ownership. 
The policy issue is whether these two taxpayer benefits justify the 
inequities resulting from the present property tax system. Rea-
sonable people disagree on this question. 
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The Commission concludes that, on balance, a 
ation system is more reasonable than an acquisition 
tem provided sufficient safeguards are in place to assure 
that homeownership is protected. 
The Commission recognizes that market valuation is 
ability-to-pay system of taxation. However, market a 
closer approximation of the taxpayer's current economic capacity 
to pay taxes relative to his or her neighbors than the acquisition 
method of assessment which artificially taxes on the basis a 
formula. 
Property tax equity, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder, 
is, the beholder ofhis or her tax bill. Generally speaking, property 
taxpayers in California think Article XIIIA of the 
Constitution (Proposition 13) with its constitutionally 
low tax rate and capped annual reassessment is lovely indeed, 
albeit unfair. 
The Commission appreciates the political inertia which 
rent provisions of Article XIIIA intrinsically create 
politic. The new property owner may wince at learning 
neighbor in an identical house pays 'significantly 
taxes but the tax rate is one percent of assessed value, less 
than pre-Proposition 13levels, and, thanks to the reassessment 
cap, she soon will be paying relatively less taxes as time passes. 
For this reason many taxpayers are lulled into accepting an 
inequitable tax structure. 
But public content, even happiness, with a law does not make 
law necessarily fair, equitable, effective or reasonable. The Com-
mission finds three compelling reasons. to reexamine the state's 
property tax structure and to recommend changes to it. 
First, legal challenges to the assessment section of Article XIIIA 
are being appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Commission 
finds no legal consensus exists on the probability of the Court 
ruling the reassessment section of Article XIIIA of the California 
Constitution unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
agreed to hear one challenge and may decide on hearing another 
later this year. A decision on constitutionality will be rendered 
by June, 1992. Given the possibility the Court will strike down 
California's current property tax assessment methodology, it is 
prudent for the Legislature to formulate and develop a contin-
gency plan. 
2 
Revenue 
Second, the size of state budget deficit (estimated at $14 billion for 
1991/92) and the financial difficulty confronting local government 
invite a review of the Article XIIIA constitu-
tionally caps property tax one ofmarketvalue, but 
under current assessment practices, property in the state 
pays less than one This erosion of the 
property tax base contributes to the strain experienced by 
local government and its The Commission's major recom-
mendations are revenue but could easily be converted to 
revenue additions for local Other Commission rec-
ommendations, while advanced for reasons of equity and fairness, 
are revenue positive. 
Third, equity 
a $17 billion tax system 
reason enough to offer improvements to it. 
existence of 
operates unfairly is 
Public opinion poll data show an overwhelming 70percent of Cali-
fornians disapprove of current assessment practices once they are 
explained in detail. 1 own experience and percep-
tion, the Commission the provisions of Article 
XIIIA, including the are popular with the 
general public both symbolically and as a matter of economic self-
interest. The Commission concludes that people do not necessar-
ily want an unfair system, but they dislike the property tax enough 
to oppose paying more of it to equalize the tax burden among prop-
erty taxpayers. 
The Commission recognizes that virtually every improvement in 
the tax system, every firmly defended tax tradition, began as an in-
novation. Proposition 13 itself was such an innovation. The Com-
mission believes these recommendations can lead to a better tax 
structure for California taxpayers. 
The Commission considered a wide range of proposals for restor-
ing equity to the property tax system and for strengthening the 
fiscal solvency oflocal government while protecting homeowners 
from unpredictable tax increases. One class of options achieve 
property tax equity by further reducing governmental reliance on 
the property tax by extending the favored tax status of pre-1978 
property owners to all property owners (or at least homeowners) 
and replacing the lost governmental revenue with other taxes. 
The Commission rejected this approach because it concluded that 
the local property tax is an appropriate revenue source for financ-
ing local services and maintaining a measure of local control. 
3 
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TRANSITION 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
TO PROTECT 
HOMEOWNERS 
Recommendation 
One-
Phaseln to 
Market Value 
The Commission 
unconstitutional. 
If the Supreme 
of Article 
adopt an alternative, 
methodology will revert 
tax rate cap), causing over an 
$5.3 billion of which would be 
instance, the Commission nH.n.-ro 
structures, 
to a market 
a) 
until the property 
four percent cap year one, six percent in two, 
eight percent year three, and so 
.. , ... " .... ·"'·" ........... revenue 
each subsequent 
sive oflocal bond service) on a county-by-county 
a level which will generate an amount of revenue equal 
to the prior year's revenue, annually 
in population and an 
d) Provide no nmne~ow1r1er 
market value will 
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Year 0- Base Year 
Assessed Value 
Tax Rate 
Tax Levy 
Year 1 - New System 
Base Assessed Value 
Ownership Changes 
AV Adjustment - 4% 
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have occurred under the acquisition method of assess-
ment as a consequence of the interaction of(b) and (c); 
e) Provide that local voters may change local tax rate caps 
by a majority vote. 
To protect current homeowners from sudden and large property 
tax in:creases, the Commission recommends that the assessment 
cap be gradually increased by two percent per year. In the first 
year following enactment of this plan, existing homeowners' as-
sessments could not be increased by more than four percent; 
second year six percent; third year eight percent and so on or until 
the homeowner's property is assessed at full market value. 
The Commission does not believe that a return to market valu-
ation must necessarily result in an overall increase in the property 
tax burden and, accordingly, recommends that local government 
tax rates be lowered by an amount approximately equal to the in-
creased revenue derived from returning to market value assess-
ments. A reasonable index to account for population changes and 
inflation should be employed. An illustration of how this rate 
adjustment would be made for a hypothetical county is shown 
below: 
Assessed Value Assessed Value 
Owner Occupied Homes Other 
$4,000,000 
$4,000,000 
200,000 
152,000 
$6,000,000 
$6,000,000 
Assessed Value 
Total 
$10,000,000 
1.00% 
$100,000 
$10,000,000 
A V Adjustment to Market 
New Construction 400.000 
4,000,000 
600.000 
152,000 
4,000,000 
1.000.000 
Total Assessed Value $4,752,000 $10,600,000 
Tax Levy= Base Year Levy adjusted for population+ inflation, 
(assumed to be 2% + 5%):$100,000 x 1.07 = 
Tax Rate = Total Tax Levy Divided by Total Assessed Value = 
$15,352,000 
$107,000 
0.7% 
Note: The total levy could be a<ljusted in the following year by the additional amounts levied on homeowners whose taxes would otherwise be lowered by this system. 
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Recommendation 
Two-
Preservation of 
Homeownership 
Since a tax rate reduction could cause some homeowners' property 
tax bills to decrease, shifting some portion of the property tax 
burden to their neighbors, the Commission recommends that 
during the phase-in period all taxpayers required to pay at least 
the same amount of property taxes they we a.ld have paid under the 
acquisition method of assessment and one percent tax rate cap. 
This phase-in approach eases the transition to market value as-
sessment for homeowners while the tax revenue cap ensures that 
tax rates will be lowered if housing price increases exceed the rate 
of inflation. These safeguards afford homeowners greater protec-
tion than existed prior to 1978. 
The Commission believes that local voters should have the right to 
adjust local property tax rates and, therefore, adds to this recom-
mendation a provision allowing changes in local tax rates by a 
majority vote of the electorate. See recommendation number five. 
The Commission recommends, in the event the U.S. Su-
preme Court invalidates the assessment section of Article 
XIIIA of the California Constitution, the Senate consider 
legislation to exempt basic shelter from all property taxes, 
and to: 
a) Return to market value assessments immediately for all 
new and current property taxpayers; 
b) Increase the homeowners' property tax exemption to 
$50,000 per home, index the exemption for inflation and 
convert the exemption to a locally administered pro-
gram; 
c) Maintain revenue neutrality by lowering (in the first 
and each subsequent year) the countywide tax rate (ex-
clusive oflocal bond service) on a county-by-county basis 
to a level which will generate an amount of revenue 
equal to the prior year's revenue, adjusted annually for 
growth in population and an appropriate inflation in-
dex; 
d) Provide that local voters may change local tax rate caps 
by a majority vote. 
6 
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Three· 
Split Tax Rates 
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To protect basic shelter from property taxation, the Commission 
recommends that the current homeowners' property tax exemp-
tion be increased to $50,000 and, thereafter, be adjusted annually 
based on an appropriate housing inflation index. Homeowners 
would not be taxed on the first $50,000 (or the basic shelter 
portion) of their homes; homes valued under $50,000 would be 
property tax-free. The policy objective of this recommendation is 
to establish a property tax haven for all homeowners for a neces-
sity of life without regard to household income. 
Because local government will no longer experience a loss of 
revenue as a result of the homeowners' property tax exemption, 
the need to continue this program as a state-administered and 
state-reimbursed program is ended. Since the entire cost of the 
homeowners' exemption will be paid for by the increased local 
revenues derived from returning to market value assessments, the 
state will be relieved of reimbursing local governments by $360 
million in 1990-91. 
The Commission does not believe that a return to market valu-
ation must necessarily result in an overall increase in the property 
tax burden. Therefore, it recommends that local government tax 
rates be lowered by an amount approximately equal to the in-
creased revenue derived from returning to market value assess-
ments. A reasonable index to account for population changes and 
inflation should be employed. 
The Commission believes that local voters should have the right to 
adjust local property tax rates and, therefore, adds to this recom-
mendation a provision allowing changes in local tax rates by a 
majority vote of the electorate. See recommendation number five. 
The Commission recommends, in the event the U.S. Su-
preme Court invalidates the assessment section of Article 
XIIIA of the California Constitution, the Senate consider 
legislation to set tax rates on homes lower than income-
producing property, and to: 
a) Return to market value assessments immediately 
for all new and current property taxpayers; 
b) Lower the property tax rate for homeowners by 
an amount sufficient to make the homeowner por-
tion of the tax roll revenue neutral for local gov-
ernment, and thereafter automatically lower the 
tax rate each year by an amount equal to the 
revenue generated by the increased valuation 
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from owner-occupied residences allowing for new 
home construction and an appropriate inflation 
index; 
c) Maintain for the business portion of the tax roll 
(apartments, agriculture, cc,mmercial and indus-
trial properties) the current one percent tax rate 
cap; 
d) Limit prospective voter-approved tax rate over-
rides to the homeowner portion of the tax roll. 
The Commission recognizes and differentiates between two cate-
gories of property taxpayers: homeowners and the owners of 
income-producing properties. And, the Commission notes the 
importance homeownership plays in California society. 
The Commission devoted extensive discussion to a variety of split 
roll or split rate proposals. Proponents and opponents of the split 
roll concept are found across the ideological spectrum. The Com-
mission, like the testimony it heard, is more divided on this issue 
than any other. 
Under this recommendation, commercial and rental residential 
property taxpayers will experience a $5.9 billion property tax 
increase over current property tax obligations. These monies will 
primarily benefit local government. The Commission judged this 
amount reasonable in light of the current $14 billion fiscal short-
fall; considering that the original intent of Proposition 13 was 
aimed mainly at reducing homeowner property tax burdens; 
recognizing that any Supreme Court action will cause this magni-
tude of property tax increase for business unless the Legislature 
elects to simply return all new tax proceeds; and, noting that 
business will still enjoy the one percent tax rate cap guaranteed in 
the California Constitution. 
A primary argument against a split tax rate system is the poten-
tial for future abuse. Critics worry that once a uniform tax roll is 
breached, divisions in the tax roll will proliferate. Other states, 
particularly Minnesota with numerous divisions ranging from five 
percent to fifty-five percent of market value, are cited. The 
Commission recognizes this danger, but, on balance, thinks the 
need for additional local government revenues, the desirability of 
maintaining low homeowner property taxes and the simplicity of 
this particular split roll proposal outweigh this concern. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation 
Four-
Generational Equity 
A major concern of the business community, which opposes any 
split roll proposal, is the prospect that it will find itself politically 
isolated in each community. The specific fear is that voters will 
approve tax overrides more readily, kno~Ning that a preponder-
ance of the tax increase will be paid by business. The Commission 
addresses this concern by restricting future voter-approved over-
rides to the homeowner portion of the roll only. However, this so-
lution, while protectingincome-producingproperty, leaves owner-
occupied residential property vulnerable to tax increases enacted 
by homeowner-voters and non-homeowner-voters alike. 
The Commission also notes that business taxpayers will be able to 
deduct any increased property tax payments from federal income 
tax payments. Thus, business property taxpayers will not be hit 
with the full impact of this tax increase and California will recap-
ture some of the federal tax windfall which occurred in the wake 
of Proposition 13. 
The following recommendations are offered as specific reforms 
which the Commission believes worthy of consideration regard-
less of Court action. Recommendations four through eight 
address specific problems which are a direct result of Article XIIIA 
of the California Constitution and which would be automatically 
resolved by a Court decision and a return to market valuation of 
property, but that should be addressed by the Senate notwith-
standing a Court decision. Finally, recommendation number nine 
concerns the requirement for comprehensive tax data and infor-
mation in the legislative process. 
The Commission recommends that the constitutional pro-
vision exempting real property inherited by a child from 
reappraisal to market value be abolished. 
Article XIIIA (Section Two) of the California Constitution exempts 
from reappraisal a property owner's home and up to $1 million of 
other real property when that property is transferred to a child. 
This exemption can be used repeatedly and indefinitely, forestall-
ing a market reassessment forever. 
The inequity is clear. One young family buys a new home and is 
assessed at full market value. Another young family inherits its 
home, but pays taxes based on their parents' date of acquisition 
even though both homes are of identical value. Not only does this 
constitutional provision offend a policy of equal tax treatment for 
taxpayers in similar situations, it appears to favor the housing 
needs of children with homeowner-parents over children with non-
9 
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Recommendation 
Five-
Local Finance & 
Local Control 
homeowner-parents. With the repeal of the state's gift and 
inheritance tax in 1982, the rationale for this exemption is negli-
gible. 
The Commission notes that remarkable disparity of treat-
ment perverts even the strongest argmnents in behalf of the 
acquisition method of assessment and, understandably, was not 
advanced in 1978 by the proponents of Proposition 13. A U.S. 
Supreme Court decision invalidating the assessment section of 
Article XIIIA, and a return to market valuation, would automati-
cally correct this inequity. 
Absent a Court decision, the Commission recommends that the 
Constitution be amended to provide that all real property trans-
ferred to children be reappraised at the time of transfer. 
The Commission recommends that the California 
Constitution be amended to grant local voters in each 
jurisdiction the right to modify local property tax rates by 
a miQority vote. 
The Commission heard local government officials present the case 
for both more local dollars and greater local control over those 
dollars. The Commission also heard testimony urging local expen-
diture reductions, that is to say, elimination or reduction of unnec-
essary or lower priority governmental expenses. 
The Commission, representing a cross section of community per-
spectives and experiences, is persuaded that local government is 
fiscally strained and that, as a result, governmental services in 
California have suffered. More important than the Commission's 
views is what a majority of local citizens think about the level of 
service and spending by their local government. A democracy 
vests in the people the right to upsize or downsize the government, 
to evaluate governmental efficiency and priorities, and to elect 
governmental policymakers. The people traditionally have exer-
cised these rights by a majority vote. 
The Commission is cognizant of the argument that vote thresholds 
higher than the standard majority vote protect the people from ex-
cessive taxation. This may be so, but it is not the way business is 
conducted in a free society. Majority rule is the established vote 
requirement for electing leaders and governing the country. Two-
thirds vote requirements permit the minority to obstruct the will 
of the majority. 
10 
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Valuation of 
Corporate Property 
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The level of taxation in California is roughly comparable to other 
states. Expressed in terms of state and local taxes paid per $1,000 
of personal income, California is slightly below the national 
average ($112 per $1000 of personal income in California versus 
$116 per $1000 nationally).2 Under these circumstances, the Com-
mission believes that it is reasonable and vvise to give local voters 
the opportunity to set local levels of taxation if for no other reason 
than different communities in a state the size of California will 
most certainly have different, and changing, requirements for gov-
ernmental service. 
Constraints on the free exercise of the people's will frustrates the 
democratic process. The current constitutional requirement pro-
hibiting local voters from increasing local property tax rates for lo-
cal purposes undercuts the ability oflocal citizens to monitor and 
manage their local government. 
The Commission notes that under the current acquisition prop-
ertytax assessment system voter overrides will widen side-by-side 
disparities. Recent property buyers will undergo larger dollar tax 
increases than longer term owners of similar property if voters 
approve tax rate increases. 
The Commission recommends that property owned by cor- , 
porations and partnerships be treated the same as all other 
property for purposes of property tax reassessment. To im-
plement this recommendation, the "change of ownership" 
statute requires review and modernization. 
Article XIIIA of the California Constitution gives the Legislature 
responsibility for defining "change of ownership" for property tax 
assessment purposes, that is, determining the point at which a 
property must be reassessed to full market value. The current 
statutory definition of "change of ownership" treats homes and 
corporate properties differently, and invites tax avoidance. 
Under the current definition of" change of ownership", residences 
are reassessed to market value upon sale. For properties owned 
by tenants-in-common, each share of the property is reassessed to 
market value when that share is sold. 
By contrast, property owned by publicly traded corporations and 
property owned by partnerships are not reappraised to market 
value unless over fifty percent of the corporate shares or partner-
ship is sold to one buyer. For instance, to use an extreme example, 
if 100percent of a corporation's stock is sold, but no one person 
11 
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Recommendation 
Seven-
State/Local Fiscal 
Accountability 
purchases more 
pretends that the .,...,..,, ..... , .. _u 
sold. 
company, California law 
by the corporation has not been 
Home-
to structure property 
to full 
Moreover, 
ownership 
market value. 
and its ct::s:::~t:r::i!St:u 
to market 
Ho.,..or•'>lf'O hoi·urt:>on a property'S true Value 
assessment. 
to avoid reassessment 
.,...,...,.,.....,,",......"'can sell its property 
example, a real estate 
can arrange to sell one-
time, eventually selling 
This ar-
assessment sec-
valuation, would 
U-"''"''-''" a Court decision, the 
statutory definition of"change 
amended provide 
market value upon a sub-
definition is inconsistent with 
acquisition method of 
The Commission future revenues accru-
ing to local "change of ownership" can 
be used for either reducing property tax rates, augmenting local 
government revenues or a combination of both. The Commission 
recommends that the funds be used to increase governmental 
resources since the current statutory 
definition causes the under taxation of some properties beyond the 
constitutional expectation of Article XIIIA. 
The Commission recommends that health and welfare pro-
grams for which a need for state intervention exists be 
funded and administered as state programs. The Commis-
sion recommends the state begin by assuming responsibil-
ity for three specified programs. 
Property Tax Equity and Revenue 
A sensible and cost-effective system for the provision of govern-
mental services should divide responsibilities clearly among dif-
ferent agencies and various levels of government to promote 
efficient management and accountable public policy. Citizen-tax-
payers have a right to know that a particular governmental agency 
or official can be held accountable for the delivery of services. 
A persistent complaint from local government officials is the pro-
liferation of unfunded state mandates imposed on local govern-
ment. The too-often heard "my hands are tied, go to Sacramento" 
from local officials is symptomatic of this problem. This refrain is 
troubling because it illustrates the murky disquiet in which 
citizens find themselves when sorting out precisely which serv-
ices, what kind of decisions and whose tax dollars are locally 
controlled. 
Among the programs considered prime for state assumption are 
judicial expenses, corrections, county health service, mental health 
programs, AFDC, In-home Supportive Services, food stamps, and 
General Assistance. Because these social services programs 
should be the responsibility of the state's taxpayers and are expen-
ditures driven by factors beyond the control oflocal decision mak-
ers, funding should not depend on local property tax wealth. 
The Commission recommends that the state begin a process ofdis-
engaging health and welfare programs from the property tax. The 
Commission identified three income distribution programs which 
should be transferred immediately to the state, both fiscally and 
administratively. The three programs are: Aid to Families and 
Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps and general assistance. 
The increased state cost for these three programs would have been 
$698 million in fiscal year 1990-91. This cost can be funded from 
state savings resulting from shifting the homeowners' exemption 
to local government, which will be $360 million plus repealing, in 
whole or in part, selected state tax expenditures. 
The Commission reviewed numerous state tax expenditures relat-
ing to property and housing. The Commission recommends that 
the expenditures for these tax programs be evaluated against 
other, possibly more pressing state program needs, including the 
Commission's recommendation to "buy out" local health and 
welfare programs. While state tax policy falls outside the Commis-
sion's purview, a partial listing of property and housing tax expen-
ditures are identified as possible candidates: 
13 
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Recommendation 
Eight-
Local Government 
Revenue 
Apportionment 
a) Capital Gains Exclusion for Inherited Property. Ex-
empts permanently from capital gains taxation the ap-
preciated State cost: $240 
JULLJUUVAA in 1991-92. 
A:.IA\.<AUOAVAA on a for 
over Excludes $125,000 of home 
value from capitali'O"'' .... "' taxation for taxpayers over 55 
years of age. State $150 million in 1991-92. 
c) Deferral of Capital Gains on Sale ofPrincipal Residence. 
Taxpayers may capital gains taxes upon sale of 
a home a of equal or greater value 
within 2 years. cost: $460 million in 1991-92. 
d) Deduction for Mortgage for Vacation and Sec-
ond Homes. are permitted to deduct from 
state income taxes mortgage interest for multiple 
residences, including vacation homes. State cost: $65 
million in 1991-92. 
e) for Vacation and 
are to deduct from 
state income taxes paid property taxes for multiple 
residences, including vacation homes. State cost: Un-
known, but substantiaP 
The Commission recommends current statutory 
allocation of property revenues among local govern-
ment jurisdictions (the 8 formula) be re-
viewed and amended accommodate changing local 
conditions. The Commission further recommends the 
Special District redesigned to af. 
ford special districts a measure of independence from 
county government. 
Thirteen years ago, the enacted on an emergency and 
temporary basis a of property tax reve-
nues to local governmental jurisdictions, a formula which was sub-
sequently permanently fixed into law by Assembly Bill 8. Since 
that time, AB 8 has remained essentially unchanged. 
The AB 8 formula is based on the relative share of property tax 
revenue each local governmental jurisdiction received in the three 
years prior to Proposition 13. Whatever the wisdom of using this 
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approach back in 1978, the formula and the data upon which it was 
based are now obsolete. 
The AB 8 formula inadequately accommodates changing local 
needs, priorities and circumstances. While accounting for new 
construction within jurisdictions, it fails account for population 
shifts among localities, service and caseload increases and de-
creases (e.g., the number of school age children; the number of 
individuals living at or below the poverty level, etc.) or other 
conditions. 
Under the AB 8 formula, some citizens are penalized in perpetu-
ity because they reside in jurisdictions that maintained low levels 
of property taxation in the pre-Proposition 13 period. The arbi-
trary use of a three year period to determine future property tax 
allocations locks in for all time the combination of property tax 
rates and assessed valuations extant in the years 1975-76 to 1977-
78. 
Some local government officials argue that basic local services are 
so important to life and property that they deserve the same kind 
of funding equalization governing local school districts. They note 
that fundamental government services, such as police and fire 
protection and emergency health care, are especially impaired 
since the AB 8 formula ignores any per capita component so that 
local government resources are frozen, unable to adjust to chang-
ing demographics. 
The Commission observes that in the event the Supreme Court 
does not invalidate the assessment section of Article XIIIA, then 
local government finance is a zero-sum situation, i.e., to alter the 
existing AB 8 formula requires shifting funds from one jurisdiction 
to another, a Herculean political task when all local governments 
are operating under tight budgets. In the event the Supreme 
Court does strike down the assessment cap, the possibility of in-
creased local revenues exists and, consequently, the opportunity 
to create a fairer distribution of local property tax revenues 
without harming the citizens of one area to help another. 
In both instances, the Commission found no justification for con-
tinuing the current AB 8 formula. It serves neither local govern-
ment nor its citizens well. A new formula is required which 
provides a measure of flexibility and adaptability. 
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Recommendation 
Nine-
Accurate Policy 
Information 
The Commission recommends that a property tax data 
base, and accompanying analytic and modeling capability, 
be developed for the Legislature and other governmental 
agencies. 
In the course of its deliberations, the Commission discovered sig-
nificant gaps in the information available to the Legislature and 
other policymakers concerning the property tax system. For in-
stance, it is very difficult, and in some instances impossible, to 
determine with accuracy and reliability the impact of proposed tax 
changes with respect to: 
a) The outcome on property tax revenues statewide; 
b) The outcome on property tax revenues by county; 
c) The outcome on property tax revenues over time; 
d) The outcome on property tax burdens by property type; 
e) The outcome on property tax burdens by length of own-
ership; 
f) The outcome on disparities in property tax burdens; 
g) The outcome on property tax burdens over time. 
Without this type of modeling capability it is nearly impossible to 
predict the impact of property tax reforms presented to poli-
cymakers. Without reliable information, policymakers may ad-
vance options which are ill-considered. 
The Commission believes that, even without the U.S. Supreme 
Court proceeding on Article XIIIA, the property tax system will 
come under increasing scrutiny in the years ahead. The fiscal 
problems oflocal government will force this evaluation. To accom-
plish this task thoughtfully requires better information than is 
currently available. 
16 
Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue 
CHAPTER II: 
CALIFORNIA'S PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM 
Taxes on property have a long history as sources of governmental 
revenue. Property taxes were utilized in ancient Rome as well as 
medieval England. Property taxes were widely levied in the 
United States during the colonial period and throughout the late 
18th and 19th centuries.4 As recently as 1902, property taxes 
accounted for more than half of total government revenues in the 
United States. 
With the growth offederal revenues in the first half of the twen-
tieth century, the property tax declined as a major source of total 
national government revenues. By the end of World War II, 
property taxes had dropped to approximately 15 percent of total 
governmental revenues in the United States, although still ac-
counting for half oflocal receipts. As income and sales taxes be-
came increasingly popular with state governments, the property 
tax emerged as the primary source of local government revenue, 
becoming primarily a local tax. 5 
At various times throughout history, taxes have been imposed on 
both tangible property, i.e., land, buildings and merchandise, and 
intangible property, i.e., securities and other financial assets. In 
more recent times, however, the trend has been toward limiting 
taxation to tangible property in general and real property in par-
ticular. Taxes on personal property are still utilized in some states 
although most, like California, exempt household goods from 
taxation.6 
The property tax was first imposed in California in 1850 as a state 
and local tax by the newly convened California Legislature. Prop-
erty taxes served as the major revenue source for state govern-
ment until the tum of the century. In 1905 the electorate approved 
the recommendations of a state Commission on Revenue and 
Taxation to give local governments the exclusive right to levy 
property taxes.7 Despite periodic difficulties with assessment 
practices over the years, reliance on property tax revenues contin-
ued and in 1977, the year before Proposition 13, the property tax 
accounted for 40 percent oflocal revenues in the state. 
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Why a Taxon 
Property? 
Is the Property 
Tax Fair? 
The use of property wealth as a basis for taxation stems from the 
general perception that it represents the best available measure of 
a taxpayer's ability pay. This assumption was clearly valid in 
times were paid in the form of lodging, 
food or other commodities, the value of total income could not 
be measured reasonable accuracy. time this rationale 
has been considerably because only tangible property, 
or more narrowly still, only real property is taxed. Nevertheless, 
"ability to pay" continues as a prime argument in support of the 
property tax when market value assessments are used to establish 
property taxpayers' relative ability to pay. 
Another supporting argument for property taxation rests on the 
notion that the greater an individual's property holdings, the 
greater his or her "stake" the community. Therefore, financial 
support for governing the community should be paid in proportion 
to the value one's property. 
Perhaps the almost universal appeal of the property tax as a 
revenue source lies in the comparative immobility of property and, 
therefore, ofthe tax base. From an administrative standpoint, real 
property easy to locate and stays put despite 
differences jurisdictions. 
Another desirable attribute of the property tax is its relative 
stability as a revenue source. This characteristic is attributable to 
two factors. One, real values are less subject to valuation 
changes than the level of general economic activity. Two, in times 
of economic fluctuations, especially downturns, periodic reassess-
ments smooth out variations in the flow of revenues to government 
treasuries. 8 
The applied to evaluate whether a tax is fair 
are the extent which it conforms to either the "benefits prin-
ciple" or the "ability to pay principle." Under the benefits prin-
ciple, a tax is said to be fair if it is levied in proportion to the 
benefits received from the government services financed from the 
tax. The ability to pay principle holds that one's "fair share" of 
taxes should be in proportion to ability to pay as measured by 
income and/or wealth. 9 
The benefit rationale as applied to property taxation is that pub-
lic services increase the value of real property and, therefore, 
should be paid for by the owners of property. A rigorous applica-
tion of the rule would seem to limit the tax to the amount necessary 
to pay for "property-related" services such as fire and police protec-
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Tax Authority of 
Local Government 
tion, and construction and maintenance of streets, sidewalks and 
other infrastructure. Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that 
the value of the services is in proportion to the value of the prop-
erty. 
Many important property-funded as police and fire 
protection (to name the most ob·vious) serve both property and 
people. A broader, and more reasonable, interpretation holds that 
all municipal services affect directly and indirectly the value of 
property within a community. Simply put, the property tax is not 
and cannot be treated as solely a property owners' user fee, paying 
for services that seemingly benefit property directly. 
Admittedly, the value of property is at best an imperfect indicator 
of the property owner's ability to pay. First, the tax is normally 
levied on the gross value of real and personal property without 
regard to the owner's debt position and, hence, true net worth. Sec-
ond, intangible property is generally excluded from the tax base so 
that at best only a partial measure of wealth is obtained. 
While the market valuation assessment methodology is not a 
perfect system for determining taxpayer net worth, it is the best 
technique known for levying a property tax that bears a relation-
ship or connection to the taxpayer's ability to pay. 
During the first three-quarters of this century the property tax in 
California was the fiscal mainstay oflocal government. It provided 
fiscal independence and local control over public services at the 
local level. Other revenue sources, such as sales or income taxes, 
either were limited by state statute or were not available to local 
governments. 
By 1975 approximately 6,300 counties, cities, special districts and 
school districts in California had authority to impose a tax 'on prop-
erty within their jurisdictions. Overlapping boundaries meant 
that a parcel could be taxed by the county and school district in 
which it was located as well as the city and several special purpose 
districts. 
Tax levies and collections were administered by county govern-
ments for all jurisdictions within the county. Composite tax rates 
were developed for each fiscal year by summing all applicable 
rates. The distribution of tax collections was determined by the 
amount levied on behalf of each jurisdiction. 
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Growth in Property 
Tax Exemptions 
Pre-1978 Assessment 
Practices 
privately owned real and per-
"""" .... ., ....... portions of the tax rolls were 
of property enjoyed full 
religious, charitable, 
personal effects. 
• Business inventories, including livestock. 
• Orchards and vineyards for the first three or four years 
are '"'" ... ~""'"""'· 
Other classes of property 
first 
substantial 
growing number 
respondingly higher rates on 
to taxation. 
exemptions, such as the 
a principal residence, and a 
disabled veterans. The 
tax base, requiring cor-
property that remained subject 
Property is taxed on value as determined by elected 
county assessors, under the supervision of the State Board 
ofEqualization. the local administration of assess-
ment practices over the have resulted in legislation giving 
the Board considerable authority to regulate assessment proce-
dures and to make independent evaluations of assessed values. 
For the most part, prior to property was assessed at the 
market value of the property as determined by sales transactions 
of comparable property. In the absence of reliable market data, es-
timated replacement cost or, the case of business property, a 
value based on anticipated income could be substituted. 
The California Constitution annual reassessment, but in 
practice county assessors were not adequately staffed to conduct 
a physical appraisal each year. 
Infrequent reassessments lagged behind the rapid increase in 
property values during the seventies. As a result, increases in tax 
bills following reassessments were sometimes substantial, pre-
cipitating complaints by property owners. These complaints 
focused on the dollar increase in the tax levy over the prior year, 
ignoring the fact that the owners has enjoyed several years of no 
increases while the property rose in value. 
Pre-1978 Property 
Tax Revenues & Ex-
penditures 
Senate on Tax Equity and Revenue 
, In fiscal1977 -78, prior to passage ofProposition 13, property taxes 
in California yielded $11.5 billion for schools and local govern-
ment. The statewide average composite rate was just over $10 per 
$100 of assessed value or about 2.5 percent of market value. The 
distribution of these revenues, together a summary of other 
local revenues, is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Projected Distribution of Property Tax Revenues 
1978-79(a) 
Dollars in millions 
Property Tax 
Average Tax Number of Property Tax Total as Percent of 
Rate (b) Jurisdiction Revenues Revenues Total Revenue 
Cities( c) 0.34% 414 $1,645 $6,093 27% 
Counties 0.73% 58 3,504 8,850 40% 
Schools 1.40% 1,114 6,468 12,125 53% 
Special Districts(d) 0.17% 4,710 831 4,405 19% 
Totals 2.58% 6,296 $12,448 $31,473 40% 
(a) As estimated by Legislative Analyst based on 1977-78 data and assuming pre-Proposition 13law. 
(b) Expressed as percent of full market value 
(c) Includes City and County of San Francisco 
(d) Includes both Enterprise and Non-Enterprise districts. 
Property taxes represent general purpose revenues, as opposed to 
dedicated, or special purpose revenues, with the exception of 
specific rates levied for purposes such as general obligation debt 
retirement. City governments provide a wide array of municipal 
services, while county governments serve as administrative agen-
cies for state required programs, as well as being responsible for 
basic municipal services to unincorporated areas. City and county 
government expenditures by function for 1977-78 are shown in 
Table 2. 
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Distribution 
Cities 
14.50% 
2.80% 
8.60% 
5.90o/o 
13.70% 
Counties 
15.10o/o 
County Expenditures 
of Total 
Category of Expenditure 
0 General Government 
00 Police and Fire 
l:a Public Works 
ml Waste Disposal 
!D Parks and Recreation 
e Libraries 
39.40% Other 
Category of Expenditure 
D General Government 
11!1 Police and Fire 
tQ Public Works 
21.90% (]] Public Assistance 
Bl Health and Sanitation 
E3 Parks and Recreation 
1m Libraries 
II Other 
13 Era. Assembly Office of Research, June 1981. 
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Emergence of the 
Property Tax Relief 
Issue 
In the decade prE~ce«tlln.e: ~-""'"'"''"""'~ 
at a rapid rate. From 
nue growth averaged 
was attributable 
to increasing tax 
tax rates. 
Tax levies continued to 
rapid rise in housing 
median price of an existing a 
year period, rising from to $62,430 in 1977.12 From 
1973-74 to 1977-78, while tax stayed flat, assessed values 
grew at a rate of12.5 percent per year ,jumping percent in just 
the last year of this n ....... nr~ 
Relief from the perceived exc~esst 
emerged as a major issue. The 
measures was 1968 
exemption the first $3,000 market value 
occupied home. This exemption was 
market value, 
mately $80 to 
ers regardless of income. 
Senior Citizens Property Tax Assistance. Provides 
refunds of up to of property taxes to 
low Int:on:te nomteO'wners 
Business Inventory Exemption. Exempted in 1986 
fifty percent of the value of business invento-
ries. The exemption increased to one hundred percent in 
1979. 
Maximum Ta:x Rates. Placed caps on tax rates levied 
by local government jurisdictions beginning in fiscal 
year 1972-73. 
Renters Ta:x Credit. tax relief to renters in 
the form of a refundable income tax credit, now worth 
$60. 
Senior Citizens Property Ta:x Postponement. Al-
lows senior citizens under $20,000 to 
postpone all or part of the on their homes until an 
ownership change occurs. 
Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue 
Williamson Land Act. Provides property tax reduc-
tions for landowners who agree to restrict their land to 
agricultural use for a period of at least ten years. 
Table 3 illustrates state payments for property tax relief programs 
for the period 1968-69 through 197 6-77, including both direct pay-
ments to taxpayers and subventions to local governments to com-
pensate for lost revenues. 
Table 3 
State Property Tax Relief Payments 
1968-69 Through 1977-78 
(Dollars in millions) 
$ ~~~---------fto~••••~B~--i~n-es_s_an-:d~Agri~.c-w:t:~~~~1---.-------.--------.-------.-------. 
Fiscal 
Year 
1200 +----------
1000 +----------
800 +----------
Exemptions (b) 
8 Renters Income Tax Credit 
118 Senior Citizens Assistance 
[JJ Homeowners Property Tax 
Exemption 
0 ~~~wu~~~~~~uw~wy~~~~wu~~~~wu~uw~~wu~~~~wu~ 
1968-69 1969-70 1970.71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 
Source: Legislative Analyst 
(a) Includes Senior Citizens Homeowners Assistance and Postponement Programs 
(b) Includes Busienss Inventory Reimbursements and Open Space Subventions 
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Immediate Impact of 
Proposition 18 on 
Taxpayers 
The immediate effect on California taxpayers was a substantial 
reduction in property tax bills. Reductions ranged from 70 percent 
in Alameda County to 37 percent in Colusa County. For an 
"average" California homeowner with a $50,000 home, the tax re-
duction amounted to approximately $750 per year. 
The distribution of the tax reduction by class of property was es-
timated by the Legislative Analyst, as displayed in Table 4. The 
table shows 45 percent of the tax savings accrued to non-residen-
tial property and only 37 percent of the tax savings accrued to 
homeowners. 
Table 4 
Estimated Tax Reductions by Type of Property 
1978-79 
$12,000 
$10.000 
$6,000 
$4,000 
$2,000 
Owner 
Occupied 
Residential 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Renter 
Occupied 
Residential 
Commercial, 
lnd1111trial & 
Agricultural 
Total 
C Pre-Prop 13 Levies 
lEI Post-Prop 13 Levies 
ra Reduction 
Percentage of Total Property Tax Reduction by Type of Property 
44.7~ 
1&7K 
Source: Legislative Analyst 
36.60% 
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$1.6 billion; or 
tax cut was 
The Homeowners' AJA'-'.U''~-''"'""-'-
Market 
Family Value of 
Income Home (a) 
$ 5,000 $30,000 
10,000 34,000 
15,000 37,500 
20,000 42,500 
30,000 54,000 
50,000 72,000 
75,000 80,000 
homes 
for no1meowne:rs 
Legislative 
Pre-
Prop. 
Tax 
$ 425 
505 
575 
675 
1,425 
Source: Legislative Analyst 
(a) Average market value for at 
assumed to be approximately 80% 
(b) Based on estimated tax liabilities 
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Immediate Impact of 
Proposition 18 on 
Local Government 
Proposition 13 became effective on July 1, 1978, just three weeks 
after its approval by voters. For the 1978-79 fiscal year, local gov-
ernments faced revenue losses of approximately $7 billion, an 
amount equal to 57 percent of property tax revenues and 22 
percent oflocal revenue from all sources. 
Proposition 13, however, did not specify how the revenues remain-
ing after the tax rate and assessment roll-backs should be allo-
cated, only that the apportionment would be "in accordance with 
law." No law existed to specify the apportionment of property tax 
revenues from a fixed tax rate among local jurisdictions. 
The revenue loss threatened local jurisdictions unevenly because 
of differing degrees of reliance on the property tax. School districts, 
for example, had received more than 50 percent of their total 
revenues from the property tax in 197 6-77, while counties relied on 
the property tax for about 35 percent of total revenues. Cities were 
less dependent, with the property tax accounting for about 15 per-
cent of city revenues, and special districts varied from zero to 90 
percent. 
In the short time before the effective date, the Legislature adopted 
a massive emergency fiscal assistance plan for local governments. 
This "bail-out" legislation, as it was called, was possible because 
the General Fund had accumulated a surplus during the previous 
year that was projected to grow during 1978-79 and beyond. 
Senate Bill 154 was enacted which: 
• Provided for the allocation among local governments of 
the property tax revenues collected under the one per-
cent cap for fiscal 1978-79 on the basis of formulas tied 
to the actual distribution of revenues in the preceding 
three years; 
• Shifted all or a part of various county health and welfare 
programs to the state; 
• Provided block grants to the cities, counties, school dis-
tricts and special districts to partially replace the prop-
erty tax revenue loss. 
The following year Assembly Bill 8, referred to as the "long range 
solution," adopted much of what had been enacted in SB 154 with 
several modifications: 
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Table 6 
Summary of Property Tax Revenues and State Aid 
Before and Mter Proposition 13 
(Dollars in Millions) 
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 
(1) (2) 
Schools - K-12 
Property Tax $4,375 $2,107 $1,699 
State Apportionments 2,323 2,618 2,538 
State Assumption of Program Costs 2,191 3,256 
Categorical Aid 707 756 1,081 
Total $7,405 $7,672 $8,574 
Community Colleges 
Property Tax $743 $325 $266 
State Apportionments 473 539 568 
State Assumption of Program Costs 290 408 
Total $1,216 $1,154 $1,242 
Counties 
Property Tax $3,154 $1,349 $1,858 
State Assumption of Program Costs 1,078 1,296 
Block Grant 424 
Total $3,154 $2,851 $3,154 
Cities 
Property Tax $,1073 $448 $725 
Block Grants 221 
Total $1,073 $669 $725 
Special Districts 
Property Tax 905 362 618 
Block Grants 190 ----
Total $ 905 $ 552 $ 618 
Source: Governor's Budget Summary 1980-81 
(1) Includes effect of Proposition 13 and SB 154 
(2) Includes effect of AB 8 
(3) Percent change from 1977-78 to 1979-80 
30 
Percent 
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(3) 
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Table 7 
Property Taxes for a Median Priced Home 
by Year of Purchase 
1989 
Value in 1989 
Year of Assessed Property Annual 
Year Acquired Purchase Value Tax Savings 
Pre 1976 $41,690 $55,009 $ 514 $1,514 
1976 48,740 63,050 600 1,428 
1977 62,430 79,176 772 1,256 
1978 71,040 88,329 870 1,158 
1979 84,330 102,798 1,025 1,003 
1980 99,760 119,222 1,201 827 
1981 107,940 126,469 1,278 750 
1982 112,040 128,699 1,302 726 
1983 114,620 129,081 1,306 722 
1984 114,510 126,428 1,278 750 
1985 120,120 130,022 1,316 712 
1986 133,930 142,128 1,446 582 
1987 142,370 148,122 1,510 518 
1988 168,560 171,931 1,765 263 
1989 196,521 196,521 2,028 -0-
Source: Adapted from Phillips, Robyn, Bestorinl!' Property Tax; Equjty 
Uneven Distribution 
of Benefits 
The most controversial aspect of Article XIIIA is the manner in 
which the benefits from the two percent annual reassessment cap 
are distributed. As noted earlier, these benefits continue to accrue 
only so long as ownership does not change, thereby permitting 
property owners to avoid reappraisal to market value. 
Aptly, the reassessment portion of Article XIIIA has been called 
the "welcome stranger" provision. The newcomer to an estab-
lished community is welcome because she will be contributing a 
larger percentage of support to local government than her well-
settled neighbors who own comparable homes. 
Because increases in market values have exceeded the two percent 
annual cap, owners of property purchased in 1975 today pay far 
less taxes than a recent home buyer for comparable property. 
Moreover, parcels with vastly different market values can be 
found which pay the same property taxes. The amount of tax a 
property owner pays has more to do with when the property was 
purchased than with current market value of that property. 
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Acquisition 
Valuation: Pro & 
Con 
Amendments to 
Article XIIIA 
In Corte Madera, a 1,584 square foot tract home sold 
in August 1989 for $369,000, which established its 
new assessment valuation for the 1990-91 tax year. A 
nearly identical home next door is assessed at $120,000 
and throughout the surrounding neighborhood com-
parable homes are assessed at $60,000 to $70,000. 
In San Mateo, a 1971 home near the Hillsdale Shop-
ping Center sold in July 1988for$401,000;theowners 
are currently paying about $4,100 in property taxes. 
Next door, a slightly bigger house built in 1969 is as-
sessed at $84,934, giving its owners a tax bill of$875. 
Advocates of the acquisition assessment system justifiably argue 
that all taxpayers are treated equally when they purchase prop-
erty, and point to the predictability and certainty of future prop-
erty tax payments from the assessment ceiling. They further note 
that the acquisition valuation system avoids taxing unrealized 
paper gains. 
Critics of the acquisition assessment system contend that cer-
tainty and predictability alone are not overriding criteria for 
evaluating a tax system. A reassessment law that automatically 
increased property taxes by 50 percent per year would be certain 
and predictable, but also confiscatory and unreasonable. 
Critics further note the negative consequence of creating perma-
nent classes of taxpayers. A new class is created for all property 
owners purchasing property on a given day, and that class will 
forever enjoy lower property taxes relative to all classes of taxpay-
ers established thereafter so long as property values exceed the 
two percent annual reassessment cap. 
The reassessment provision of Article XIIIA offers a Mephistophe-
lian solution: the taxpayer is granted his wish for a predictable, 
moderate property tax for himself, but tax equity for his neighbors 
is forsaken. The ideal, of course, is for a property tax system to be 
both fair and predictable. 
Because the benefits of the annual reappraisal cap are substan-
tial, a change of ownership, triggering a reassessment to current 
market value, can produce a sizeable increase in property taxes. A 
number of exemptions have been enacted through ballot proposi-
tions to prevent reassessment in specific instances. In 1986 the 
following ballot propositions were approved by the voters: 
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In 1989 ruled in a West 
to those prescribed 
provisions. In 
case, Allegheny Pittsburg Coal Co. v. County CQmmission ofWeb-
ster County, County followed a 
practice of reassessing was sold, but did little 
bring other properties into increasing market values. 
This practice, not sanctioned by any law or policy, resulted 
in wide property 
Following this Supreme Court three cases were filed 
California courts challenging the assessment system contained in 
Article XIIIA of the California Constitution. These cases, two of 
which are currently being to the U.S. 
allege that the "welcome of assessing a 
purchased property at its price, while a comparable 
property next value, denies taxpayers 
equal protection as Constitution. 17 
Two of these cases, Stephanie Nordlingerv. JohnJ. Lynch and the 
County of Los Angeles and Northwest Financial y. State Board of 
Equalization and San Diego County, argue that recently pur-
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. Impact on Business 
Property Taxpayers 
chased single family homes are assessed at higher values than 
nearby comparable properties. In Nordlinger, for example, the 
plaintiff argues that her residence, purchased in March, 1989 is 
taxed at $1,700 while her next door neighbor, with a larger house 
on a larger lot, has a tax bill of $368. The third case, R. H. Macy 
& Co. y Contra Costa County, makes a similar argument regard-
ing business property. 
Both the Nordlinger and Macy cases cite evidence of widespread 
assessment disparities. Studies submitted by the plaintiff in 
N ordlinger compared assessments of properties purchased in 
1989 to assessments of properties purchased before 1975 in 46 
neighborhoods in Los Angeles County. The data indicate that 
ratios of assessments of 1989 purchased properties to 1975 pur-
chased properties ranged from 9 to 1 in Lincoln Park and 17 to 1 
in Santa Monica's Ocean Park. 
In the Macy case, the plaintiff and the county jointly conducted a 
study of residential and business properties that had changed 
ownership in 1987. Those properties that had not previously 
changed ownership since 1975 were identified and the 1987 
assessed value under the two percent cap was compared to the 
1987 market value. This study revealed that the average market 
value of properties assessed on the basis of 1975 values was 3.2 
times the assessed value . 
While most business leaders opposed the Jarvis-Gann initiative, 
the impact of Proposition 13 has been quite favorable for business 
property taxpayers. Forty-five percent of the immediate property 
tax cut resulting from Proposition 13, or $2.9 billion, accrued to 
owners of agricultural, business, commercial and industrial prop-
erty. If income-producing residential property (apartments and 
other renter-occupied properties) is considered business property, 
then sixty-three percent, or $4 billion in tax savings accrued to 
business property taxpayers. See Table 4. 
Contrary to some predictions, the property tax burden has not 
shifted from commercial and industrial property to residential 
property since 1978. It was widely thought that residential prop-
erties changed ownership more frequently than business property 
and, therefore, would experience a higher assessment ratio over 
time, and a correspondingly greater share of the tax burden. 
Current data do not support this hypothesis. 
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Inasmuch as Article XIIIA does not distinguish between classes of 
property, taxpayers owning all types of property are treated alike 
for both tax rate and tax assessment purposes. Consequently, the 
same side-by-side equity and tax: burden distributional issues 
affecting homeowners also touch busines;;: property owners. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND 
PROPERTY TAX REVENUE 
Following passage of Proposition 13, local government struggled 
to provide basic public services with significantly fewer resources. 
During the 1981-1982 recession state revenues fell below the 
levels specified by the "deflator" provision of AB 8. In two 
successive fiscal years the Legislature suspended implementation 
of the deflator clause but enacted selective reductions in state aid 
which exacerbated the fiscal problems oflocal governments. Ef-
forts were made to alleviate the revenue shortages by enhancing 
local government's ability to levy various fees and user charges. 
In 1984 the Senate Office of Research published a study which 
detailed the Legislature's actions in the area of local finance 
during the five years following Proposition 13, and also reported 
the fiscal condition of cities, counties and local governments at 
that time.17 The findings concluded that: · 
• County general purpose revenue, after adjusting for in-
flation, declined 16 percent between 1977-78 and 1983-
84. 
• County expenditures (inflation adjusted) on all local 
services except public protection and debt service de-
clined during this period. 
• City general purpose revenues (inflation adjusted) fell 
by 9 percent during the same five years. 
• Revenues to non-enterprise special districts dropped by 
6 percent. 
Later that year, the Legislature adopted the"Long-TermLocal Fi-
nancing Act of 1984" intended to meet local government needs on 
a permanent basis. The measure increased local government's 
permanent share of the Vehicle License Fee but eliminated the 
inventory tax subventions. The net effect was only a marginal im-
provement in the local fiscal situation. Since 1984 the revenue 
pinch on local government has tightened, despite continued state 
efforts to alleviate the problem. 
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Local Government 
Finance 
In addition to the revenue loss, Proposition 13 profoundly altered 
the relationship between state and local government, shifting to 
the state most decision-making authority concerning the amount 
and distribution oflocal revenues. Even prior to Proposition 13, 
the state had preempted the income tax and controlled the rate of 
local sales taxes. With a maximum property tax rate imbedded in 
the state constitution and the distribution of the revenues gov-
erned by state law, local governments and school districts lost 
their last major source of fiscal independence. Power shifted to the 
state. 
To speak of government finance in California today is to become 
embroiled in a discussion about the appropriate size, scope and 
nature of government's mission. Everyone, it seems, wants to "cut 
the fat in government" and then keep it on a strict diet. But one 
taxpayer's useless program may well prove another's essential 
sel'Vlce. 
Moreover, the Commission is aware of the invisible nature of many 
vital governmental services. Water quality control or mosquito 
abatement, for example, are preventive actions, noticed by the 
general public only in their absence. Assigning specific value or 
priority ranking to each governmental program in these instances 
is difficult which is why governmental budgeting is a process of 
comprormse. 
Finally, the Commission notes that oftentimes the decision to 
provide a particular governmental service is less a choice about if 
and more a determination about when. Some services are a 
question of paying now, or paying later. In this category, mental 
health care for homeless persons is a good example. Care can be 
provided early on by mental health workers or later by police offi-
cers who, responding to citizen complaints, take a disturbed 
homeless person into custody. The outcome, of course, is the poor 
utilization of limited police manpower, crowded jails, clogged 
courts and, ultimately, the involvement of the mental health 
system anyway. 
The Commission did not undertake an independent, analytical 
survey about the fiscal health oflocal government. However, it did 
hear testimony on this issue. This testimony, coupled with the 
informed judgment of individual Commissioners, gave the Com-
mission reason to conclude that California local government is 
attempting to meet an ambitious governmental service agenda 
with inadequate means. 
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The Counties The revenue crunch has been felt most keenly by county govern-
ments because of the burden of administering state mandated 
health, welfare, and criminal justice programs. In the "1990-91 
Budget: Perspectives and Issues," the Legislative Analyst18 pre-
sented an evaluation of the fiscal capacity of counties as measured 
by the level and change in "local purpose revenues" from 1984-85 
through 1987-88. These revenues are defined as the excess of 
general purpose revenues, i.e. property tax, sales tax and non-
dedicated state subventions, over expenditures on state required 
programs. The study found that, after adjusting for population 
growth and inflation, local purpose revenues declined 6.5 percent 
during the four-year period. In 1984-85 counties used approXi-
mately 50 percent of general purpose revenues to support state re-
quired programs. By 1987-88 this share had risen to 55 percent. 
During that period, the costs of state required programs increased 
40 percent, while general purpose revenues grew 25 percent. 
Table 9 sets forth the amounts of general purpose revenues and 
state required programs for these two years. 
Table 9 
County General Purpose Revenues and Local Expenditures 
for State Required Programs 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Percent 
1984-85 1987-88 Change 
General Purpose Revenues $5,250 $6,582 25.4% 
State Required Program Expenditures 
Judicial 1,097 1,495 36.3% 
Corrections 790 1,140 44.3% 
County Health Services 186 284 52.3% 
Mental Health 59 91 53.7% 
AFDC 265 321 21.0% 
IHSS 6 18 178.0% 
Food Stamps 93 111 19.9% 
General Assistance 124 200 60.8% 
Total Expenditures $2,620 $3,660 39.6% 
Residual General Purpose Revenues $2,630 $2,922 11.2% 
Source: Legislative Analyst, as reported in Countjes on the Fiscal Fault Ljne 
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The Legislative Analyst's study also pointed out considerable vari-
ation in fiscal capacity among counties. In 1987-88 the average 
county had per capita local purpose revenues of$108. Individual 
counties, however, received from $57 per capita in Solano County 
to $599 in Sierra County. An extreme case was Alpine County with 
a small population and a relatively large share of the property tax. 
Several counties experienced sharp declines in local purpose 
revenues during the period, with fourteen counties losing more 
than ten percent. Ten counties had both below average and declin-
ing per capita local purpose revenues. The result of diminishing 
revenues for non-state required programs is reductions in local 
programs such as public safety, parks and recreation, and public 
works. 
A recent study by the California Counties Foundation19 discusses 
some of the problems attendant to state required programs. As 
seen in Table 7, the two largest expenditure areas in this category 
are judicial and corrections. The study notes that more than 1000 
changes were made by the Legislature in misdemeanor and felony 
statutes between 1984 and 1989. These changes established new 
crimes, extended sentences for existing crimes, and made incar-
ceration mandatory for an increased number of crimes. These 
changes clogged court calendars, increased prosecution and de-
fense costs, and dramatically increased the need for county jail and 
prison cells. 
A second program area which has contributed to counties' fiscal 
distress is health care. The Foundation study characterizes the 
public health care system in California as an example of a dysfunc-
tional state/county relationship. The study notes that in 1982 the 
state transferred responsibility for the medically indigent adult 
population to the counties with an allocation of funds equal to only 
70 percent of what the state had expected to spend for this program 
under Medi-Cal. Further cuts in state support for the program 
were made in the 1990-91 state budget. 
A number of counties have recently been reported on the verge of 
bankruptcy; in 1990 Butte County threatened bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. This action was forestalled by last minute action by the 
Legislature which, according to county officials, averted the 
immediate crisis but did not solve the long-term problem. The 
Foundation report concludes that a general county fiscal collapse 
is inevitable unless fundamental structural changes are made in 
the programs and responsibilities performed by counties and the 
revenues available to finance them. 
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The Schools 
Although cities have generally suffered less severe fiscal distress, 
they are not without problems. In general, the revenue raising 
authority of both charter and general law cities is considerably 
broader than either counties or special districts. This authority, 
together with the ability to increase for services delivered 
by municipal enterprise activities, has extensively utilized by 
cities to maintain fiscal stability. 
A 1988 study20 compared total per capita city revenues, adjusted 
for inflation and including enterprise activities, for 1977-78 and 
1984-85. This comparison showed that revenues had increased by 
9.7 percent during the period. Without enterprise activity reve-
nues, a decline of16.1 percent was reported. This comparison also 
showed that both federal and state aid had dropped significantly 
during the period. 
A more recent report, commissioned by the League of California 
Cities21 , showed similar results with respect to general or non-
enterprise revenues. According to this report, inflation adjusted 
per-capita general revenues in 1987-88 were down by 17.5 percent 
from 1977-78, indicating a slight further deterioration since 1984-
85. 
A major contributor to the revenue decline has been a steady drop 
in federal aid. In the sixties and early seventies federal programs 
for cities were a major revenue source. Many of these programs 
were curtailed or discontinued after 1970. Total revenue from this 
source, adjusted for inflation, declined from $2.1 billion in 1977-78 
to $600 million in 1987-88. 
In addition to substantial increases in enterprise activity charges, 
cities have increased fees for non-enterprise activities, utility 
users taxes, and the transient occupancy tax. Growth in these 
taxes has been somewhat slowed by Proposition 62, approved in 
1986, which requires general law cities to obtain voter approval for 
increases in these levies. 
The League report concludes that the revenue base of California 
cities has not kept pace with population growth and inflation and 
cities currently have significantly less ability to support services 
to their population than they did eleven years ago. 
The financing of elementary and secondary education in Califor-
nia has a long, complex and controversial history. Two decades 
ago, local revenue sources, primarily the property tax, provided 
over sixty percent of the funding for K-12 operations. School dis-
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trict budgets were set by locally elected boards and after consider-
ing the amount of state aid available, property tax rates were set 
at a level required to produce the revenue necessary to fund the 
budget. The amount spent per pupil varied widely with the 
assessed property value in the district and the commitment oflo-
cal residents. 
In 1971 the California Supreme Court held in Serrano y. Priest 
that because local property wealth, i.e., the property tax base, was 
a major determinant in the level of spending, the local school fi-
nancing system was unconstitutional since a child's educational 
opportunity was predicated on the happenstance of whether his or 
her school district was property rich or property poor. 
The Serrano decision touched off a debate in the education commu-
nity and the State Legislature on how best to equalize spending to 
assure that equal general purpose dollars were available to each 
school district for each California school child. In 1976 a second 
ruling by the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 1971 decision, but it 
was not until passage of Assembly Bill65 in 1977 that a definitive 
plan was put in place to implement the Court's mandate. Prior to 
AB 65, Senate Bill 90 of 1972 was the first major legislative 
attempt to address the Serrano decision. This measure provided 
a guaranteed level of state funding per pupil, included additional 
funds for school equalization to be phased in over five years, and 
imposed for the first time revenue limits on each local school 
district. These revenue limits, which became effective for fiscal 
year 1973-74, effectively limited school budgets so that high 
wealth school districts, i.e., districts with high property values, did 
not have unrestricted dollar resources and, conversely, low wealth 
school districts, i.e., ones with low property values, received a state 
subsidy. In effect, school district general purpose budgets were 
equalized. 
Proposition 13 in 1978 negated AB 65 and created another up-
heaval in the structure of education funding. As noted earlier, 
schools, along with local governments, were given a formula-
determined share of the property tax revenue raised by the one 
percent tax rate. The allocation to local school districts was 
reduced in 1979 to allow for shifting additional tax revenues to the 
cities, counties, and special districts. The loss of school property 
tax revenue was made up by increased state aid, and the overall 
level of funding for individual school districts was reduced five to 
fifteen percent for the fiscal year 1978-79, depending upon whether 
the district was below or above the average spending level per 
pupil. 
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In 1988 California voters approved Proposition 98, designed to 
guarantee a minimum level of funding for schools and community 
colleges. This measure specified that total state General Fund 
support for schools could not be less than larger of a) an amount 
equal to the percentage of General revenue allocated to 
Kindergarten-14 education in 1986-87, b) the same amount 
received in the prior year, adjusted for inflation and enrollment. 
Proposition 98 also required a portion of any state excess revenues, 
i.e., revenues in excess of the Article XIIIB constitutional spend-
ing limit, be distributed to schools and community colleges rather 
than returned to taxpayers. The excess revenues are limited to 
four percent of the minimum school funding level. The minimum 
funding level requirement may be suspended for one year by a two-
thirds vote of the legislature. The excess formula was modified by 
Proposition 111 in 1990 which further complicated the state's 
school finance system. 
The net political and fiscal outcome of the legislation implement-
ing the Serrano decision and Proposition 13 has been to substan-
tially transfer decision-making authority for the financing of 
schools from local boards to the state. Although property taxes 
still account for about thirty percent of total local funding for 
schools, school districts have no control over the amount of tax 
revenue schools receive. Spending levels per pupil are established 
by state law with the state providing the aid necessary to make up 
the difference between these levels and property tax receipts. 
One argument on behalf of maintaining a local school property tax 
advances the notion that the local property tax enhances local con-
trol. However, local policy and decision-makingis no longer linked 
to the local property tax because, as noted above, the Serrano 
decision and the state constitution establishes local school budg-
ets. 
As local property wealth, i.e., assessed valuation, in a school 
district increases, state aid is reduced (i.e., if assessed valuation 
increases faster than the revenue guarantee created by Proposi-
tion 98), transforming school districts into de facto property tax 
collection agencies for the state. In effect, property tax revenues 
are funneled to the state. 
The estimated composition ofK-12 funding in 1990-91 is shown in 
Table 10. As shown in this table, state support now accounts for 
more than 60 percent of the total. 
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Source of Funds 
Table 10 
Total Revenue for K-12 Education 
1990-91 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Amount Percent of Total 
State General Fund Apportiornnents 
State General Fund Categorical Aids 
State Lottery Fund 
$10,696 
4,331 
614 
519 
1,789 
5,014 
305 
42.3% 
17.1% 
2.4% 
2.1% 
7.1% 
Other State Aid 
Federal Funds 
Local Property Taxes 
Local Debt Service Taxes 
Other Local Revenues 2,025 
19.8% 
1.2% 
8.00;0 
Total $25,293 lOO.OOAl 
Source: Governor's Budget, 1991-92 
Of the $15.5 billion in state General Fund aid, $4.3 billion or 28 
percent, represents categorical aid. These funds are earmarked 
for specific education programs and may not be used for other 
purposes. Categorical aid includes funding for a wide variety of 
programs such as special education for handicapped children and 
educationally disadvantaged youth. 
Local revenues other than the property tax come from a variety of 
sources, most of which are limited to specific purposes. Some of the 
ways which schools have generated additional special purpose 
revenues are: 22 
Developer Fees. Fees on new construction are collected 
from real estate developers to help pay for school construc-
tion. These fees are exacted by cities or counties on behalf 
of school districts, and may range from a few hundred to 
several thousand dollars per house. This revenue source is 
not available in already settled areas which, nevertheless, 
require school building maintenance, reconstruction or ex-
pansion. 
Special Taxes. A few districts with affluent citizens have 
succeeded in getting "special taxes" approved by the neces-
sary two-thirds majority of voters in the district. Because 
any increase in the one percent tax rate is prohibited under 
Article XIIIA, these levies take the form of flat annual 
amounts per parcel, rather than levies calculated on the 
basis of the assessed value of the property. 
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Local Fund Raising. Some school districts, again with 
more affluent citizens, have been successful in private fund 
raising efforts for the of or 
cial school projects and an ongoing source of 
revenue for most districts, charitable contribu-
tions have not proven 
Overall expenditures per pupil, adjusted for inflation, amounted 
to $3,54 7 in 1977-78 for K-12 schools in California. This figure 
dropped to $3,409 the year following Proposition 13 and hit a low 
of $3,258 in 1982-83. Since that year has risen fairly steadily, 
reaching a peak of$4,263 in 1988-89. In the current year (1990-
91) it is estimated to drop to $4,168. For 1991-92 the Governor is 
proposing to suspend Proposition 98 guarantees and 
budgeting for a spending level of$4,07 6 per student for the coming 
school year.23 
California schools face major, and widely recognized, problems. 
Among its dubious honors, California attempts to educate its 
children in the nation's largest class sizes. As the doorway to 
Southeast Asia and much of South America, California schools 
bear the responsibility for educating the children of this era's 
migration to the United States. Enrichment programs are cur-
tailed or non-existent in many school districts and physical plant 
maintenance is deferred beyond reasonably prudent standards. 
A problem permeating all levels of government in California is the 
deterioration and inadequacy of the infrastructure. Although this 
condition is not easily quantified, there is evidence that the state 
is falling behind in maintaining existing transportation, sewage 
treatment and waste disposal facilities, and in constructing new 
facilities to meet the demands of a growing population. Traffic 
studies show congestion in urban areas is increasing at rates ex-
ceeding the population growth as a result of inadequate streets, 
highways and mass transit systems. The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has identified California as one of the states in 
greatest need of sewage treatment facilities. The California Waste 
Management Board has projected that several counties, including 
Los Angeles County, will exhaust all existing and planned landfill 
capacity within the next decade. The enormity of California's in-
frastructure needs is virtually unchallenged by informed commen-
tators.24 
Between 1978 and 1986 local governments were prohibited from 
raising property taxes to service General Obligation bonds issued 
to finance facilities. This prohibition brought local government 
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The fiscal constraints have become an effective po-
litical tool for no-growth and slow-growth advocates. Communi-
ties understandably are reluctant allow development which 
adds to the infrastructure and ecological burdens of an area (in-
creased traffic, for more potholes and more air 
pollution) if the short-term long-term carrying costs associ-
ated with the development are paid for. 
Inequities of the 
Allocation System 
One unfortunate result is leapfrog development. Where 
veloper fees, high land costs and community opposition combine to 
thwart new housing, 
people will live where housing 
impact is urban sprawl, longer more air pollution, 
abandonment of the city center 
As noted earlier, Article XIIIA required the Legislature to create 
a system for allocating the revenues generated by the one percent 
tax rate to the various jurisdictions within each county. AB 8 
required that property tax revenues generated in 1978-79 be 
allocated to jurisdictions within a county on the basis of historical 
pro rata shares during the preceding three years. These shares 
were adjusted for the shift of property tax revenues from schools 
to local governments which was contained in AB 8. Revenues 
generated by increases in assessed values subsequent to 1978-79 
were assigned only to those jurisdictions in which assessed value 
growth took place, again on the basis of historical shares. 
Although some modifications have been made to the formulas in 
the intervening years, the basic system remains in place. The 
formula locked in, for alljurisdictions and for all time, the property 
tax revenue distribution pattern in existence during the three 
years prior to Proposition 13. No flexibility exists in the formula 
to recognize the changing responsibilities oflocal governments or 
the needs of residents. 
Jurisdictions which believed they had been fiscally prudent in not 
levying property taxes or by maintaining low tax rates in the pre-
1978 period protest that they are being penalized. One anomaly 
to appear was 30 cities that had never levied a property tax and 
were thus forever foreclosed from receiving any property tax 
revenues. This situation persisted until1988 when counties were 
required to transfer a share of their property tax revenues to cit-
ies with no or very low revenues. Taxpayers soon realized that all 
property owners pay the same basic property tax rate regardless 
of where in the state they live and what local government services 
they receive. 
Under current law, county supervisors enjoy virtually unlimited 
discretion over the allocation of Special District Augmentation 
Funds to special districts within the county. Counties have the 
authority to shift funds among special districts, effectively setting 
policy priorities among special districts and, in tight fiscal circum-
stances, favoring county dependent districts to alleviate county 
fiscal problems. 
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Funding New 
Governmental 
Jurisdictions 
In the years following 1979 an elaborate procedure was put in 
place to resolve the problem new or expanding jurisdictions. 
Under the pre-1978 system, a new would simply add its 
rate to the rates being levied by Because 
Proposition 13limited the total rate 
was required to share the one revenues with the new 
Under the system devised for this purpose, an area proposing in-
corporation must apply to the Agency Formation Commis-
sion (LAFCO) in the county obtain an allocation of tax revenue 
as well as approval for incorporation. procedures require 
LAFCO to determine the services to be shifted to the new city from 
the county or special district, and the cost of those services. The 
revenue to be allocated to the new city is based on this determina-
tion. In the case of annexations by existing cities, negotiations 
must be successfully completed the city and county re-
garding any adjustment in the revenue sharing formula as it 
applies to the area to be annexed.27 These procedures and negotia-
tions invite controversy. 
In addition to the problems involving newly created jurisdictions 
and changing boundaries, and inequities 
developed as a development. 
which are relatively stable, and which growth in assessed value 
has been slow, suffer fiscal distress to a greater degree than more 
rapidly growing areas. The slow growth areas may be character-
ized both by the absence of new construction and by a relatively low 
turnover of ownership of existing properties. The assessed 
value growth in these communities, therefore, is derived primarily 
from the annual two percent assessed value increases. 
A further complicating factor in the allocation system is the 
growing use of redevelopment agencies. These agencies, which 
can be formed by a city, are created for the purpose of promoting 
development in "blighted" areas by purchasing and making land 
available to private developers for commercial, industrial, or resi-
dential construction. The agency is entitled to receive all the 
revenue generated by the increase in assessed value within its 
boundaries. This arrangement siphons off revenues which other-
wise would accrue to the city, county or special districts whose 
boundaries overlap those of the redevelopment agency. Propo-
nents argue that without redevelopment agency fiscal support the 
new development, and thus the increase in assessed valuation, 
would not occur. 
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Court Challenges 
to the Allocation 
System 
and Revenue 
Two challenges to the AB 8 allocation system are currently 
pending in the courts. These cases28 are as follows: 
County of San Diego y, Controller of the State of California. 
In this action, San Diego County that AB 8 requires 
an unfairly large proportion of tax collections in 
San Diego County be allocated to schools. According to the 
county, this allows the state to provide a relatively smaller 
subsidy to San Diego County Schools than it provides in 
other counties while denying the county government reve-
nues to which it is entitled. 
City ofRancho Mirage v. County of Riverside. The city of 
Rancho Mirage is a no-property-tax city. In this lawsuit, the 
city argues that because the AB 8 allocation formula is 
based on the amount of property taxes levied by a local 
agency prior to Proposition 13, no-property-tax cities like 
Rancho Mirage are unfairly penalized by being denied any 
allocation of the tax, even though their citizens pay the 
same tax rate as citizens living elsewhere in the county. 
A third case, City of Rancho Cucamonga. et a1. y Counties of San 
Bernardino and Los Angeles, was the subject of a recent State Su-
preme Court ruling. This suit was filed by a group of cities against 
the Counties of San Bernardino and Los Angeles and the cities of 
Redlands and Los Angeles. The plaintiff cities, which are either 
no-property-tax or low-property-tax cities, argue that the AB 8 
systemunfairlyshiftspropertytaxesawayfromhistorically"frugal" 
cities and benefits historically "spendthrift" cities within any 
given county. This is detrimental to taxpayers because their tax 
dollars are exported to finance services to citizens of other commu-
nities. The Court ruled against the plaintiffs. 
The central theme of the arguments in these cases is the inequity 
created because all residents of the state pay the same basic one 
percent tax rate but receive different levels of services as a result 
of the unequal allocation of revenues. The intractable aspect of 
this dilemma is the "zero-sum" requirement imposed by the one 
percent tax rate limitation, to wit, any increase in the allocation to 
one jurisdiction must be offset by a reduction to another. 
51 
Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue 
52 
Michael Kahn 
Irene Angelo 
Gerald Cochran 
Melvin Gagerman 
Robyn Phillips 
Jack Theimer 
lola Williams 
Senate 
CHAPTERV: 
STATEMENTS BY COMMISSIONERS 
The breadth and diversity of experience of the Commission's 
eighteen members inevitably generated a range of perspectives 
about the issues at hand and the specific recommendations advo-
cated by the Commission. To facilitate the fullest airing of these 
viewpoints, this chapter contains individual statements by Com-
missioners. 
Some statements disagree with one or more Commission recom-
mendations. Some statements agree with particular recommen-
dations, but for reasons different than the report states. All the 
statements bear careful reading for, considered together, they are 
a portrait of the Commission's discussion about property tax 
equity and revenue. 
Proposition 13 was a revolt by the taxpayers against the frighten-
ing uncertainty of perpetually rising property taxes. Proposition 
13's legacy of predictable and manageable taxation can and should 
be preserved. But Proposition 13's two other legacies - uncon-
scionable tax disparity between people in identical situations; 
and, starvation of the educational, health and welfare services of 
our state threaten our democratic fonn of government and the hu-
manitarian ideals of our society. There is simply no legitimate 
excuse for discriminating against the young, the mobile and the 
poor through a property tax system that allows many affluent 
property owners in our state to perpetuate their incredibly low 
taxes while the poorest and youngest bear the greatest proportion 
of the tax burden. The testimony before the Commission and the 
shared experiences of the Commissioners echoed the cries of 
frustration and consternation dominating our newspapers, televi-
sion and radio and news reports over the shocking conditions of 
California's schools and critical social services caused by under-
funding. 
Because of these dual legacies as discussed in the reasoning of the 
Report, we endorse enthusiastically the Commission's Report. 
But, we do not agree that Californians or their elected representa-
tives are paralyzed from dealing with the undemocratic and 
harmful legacies of Proposition 13 until the courts inevitably rule 
that Proposition 13 violates our fundamental laws. We believe 
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California has a unique confluence oftwo circumstances: an unfair 
property tax system which dramatically undertaxes our most 
prosperous citizens and a fiscal crisis of historic magnitude. Ac-
cordingly, we believe the recommendations of the Commission 
should be enacted by the Legislature and the people as soon as pos-
sible. Such enactments should be designed to equalize the tax 
burden on all property owners in a fashion that produces sufficient 
revenue to properly sustain the schools and public services which 
Californians deserve. 
We disagree with a fundamental recommendation of the Commis-
sion: enactment of a "split roll" for property taxes in California. 
Under the proposed plan, all business property would be brought 
up to current market value and then reassessed annually. These 
taxpayers would experience an immediate $5.9 billion tax increase 
and would face increases annually. 
Under current law, thousands of corporations and proprietorships 
have been reassessed due to sales, mergers, changes of ownership 
and new construction. In fact, businesses currently pay 67 percent 
of the property taxes in California, up from 63 percent when Prop. 
13 was passed in 1978. If this proposal were adopted, business 
would pay about 80percent of the property tax. 
We believe this program would be very damaging to California's 
economy which must create 250,000 jobs each year to keep unem-
ployment from rising. In recent months, there has been extensive 
negative publicity about California's business climate and the 
potential erosion of our employment base. 
A recent survey by the California Business Roundtable of 836 
California firms revealed that 41percent of the companies have 
plans to expand outside of California and 14percent of all compa-
nies (24 percent of manufacturers) have plans to relocate outside 
California. 
The Grant Thorton Company ranking of California's manufactur-
ing climate in 1989 was a dismal22nd out of the 29 states with high 
manufacturing intensity. Results from these and other surveys 
confirm the negative impact of very high costs for taxes, litigation, 
worker compensation, housing, health care and environmental 
regulations. The split roll will turn one of the few positive features 
of California's business tax climate to another major negative. 
There is greatly increased activity by recruiters from other states 
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attempting to move California's companies and jobs to their areas. 
The split roll property tax is a corporate recruiter's dream for 
states such as Texas, Nevada, North Carolina 
and others who have lower business other expenses than 
California-and they are quick to adverti this fact. 
Faced with major tax increases, most companies will 
have one of only two options: for those companies that can do so, 
raise prices (for food, rent, clothing, goods and services). In effect, 
they will collect taxes through the price structure-which is 
regressive and which hides the cost of government. The option to 
raise prices is usually not available for companies that market 
their products in a highly competitive worldwide market. Their 
options are grim: to reduce employment, capital expenditures, or, 
in many cases, move to another state with a more hospitable 
business climate. 
The split roll would, ironically, hit hardest those industries such 
as aerospace and electronics that are now the priority targets of 
out-of-state recruiters. It would raise taxes dramatically on the 
companies that our state needs to provide employment into the 
next century. 
As noted in the report, the split roll concept, as implemented in 
several other states, has only led to more splits in the tax rolls and 
to more favorable treatment for certain classes of property. There 
will be demands for special treatment for small business, for rental 
property ("shelter deserves special treatment"), for agriculture, 
for other favored commercial activities. The result: proliferation 
of the property tax roll, as in Minnesota, which at one point had 31 
classifications for special treatment. Minnesota's then tax com-
missioner told a 1970's tax group in California, "My advice for 
states contemplating adopting the split roll is simple: don't do it." 
And that is the advice of the authors of this statement to people 
looking at the split roll as an "easy" way to raise billions: don't do 
it. 
The purpose of this statement is to confirm my overall support for 
the Commission's report, and to emphasize an important clarifica-
tion for recommendations one, two and three. 
First, I am pleased to endorse the Commission's report as a whole, 
and believe that it is constructive and reasonable in dealing with 
a very complex problem. While there are many improvements 
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offered by the Commission's recommendations, I am particularly 
in support of the recommendations which propose that local voters 
may change the local tax rate caps by a majority vote. This corrects 
what I believe to be a major error in Proposition 13 which currently 
denies a community the right to tax itself if it chooses to do so in 
order to preserve or improve public services. 
Second, I feel it is important to clarify the recommendations in the 
report that propose to "Maintain revenue neutrality by lowering 
(in the first and each subsequent year) the countywide tax rate ... to 
a level which will generate an amount of revenue equal to the prior 
year's revenue, adjusted for growth in population and an appropri-
ate inflation index." More specifically, this concept is proposed as 
recommendations l(c), 2(c), and 3(b). 
There is a major problem with this concept as currently worded, in 
that revenue growth, particularly from new development, would 
effectively be averaged countywide rather than attributed to the 
individual areas/communities within the county that experience 
growth. Under this scenario, cities, school districts and special 
districts within a particular county that allow development would 
not receive a commensurate growth in revenue to provide services. 
At the same time, areas within a county that are not experiencing 
growth (by choice or circumstance) would receive the same level of 
revenue growth as developing areas. 
In order to avoid penalizing local governments that are experienc-
ing growth, any adjustments for "revenue neutrality" must not be 
revenue neutral from growth, only from inflation. Further, those 
cities, school districts, and special districts within a county that 
are experiencing growth should receive commensurate growth in 
property tax revenue. In order to accomplish this, growth in 
property tax revenue from new development should not be subject 
to the "revenue-neutral" controls, or any adjustment factors should 
include an upward adjustment for development. 
In order to effectively deal with growth, the system must attribute 
growth in property tax revenue from development to those juris-
dictions that are accommodating the growth. A countywide 
system will not work; this is why the impl~mentation of Proposi-
tion 13 was quickly changed from the countywide growth approach 
of SB 154 that lasted for only one year, to the current AB 8 
approach that attributes growth in assessed value to the individ-
ual tax rate areas within a county. 
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APPENDIX A: 
SENATE RESOLUTION 42 (HART) 
BILL TEXT 
AMENDED IN SENATE 
AMENDED IN SENATE 
MARCH 6, 1990 
FEBRUARY 26, 1990 
and Revenue 
INTRODUCED BY Senators Hart, Bergeson, Leroy Greene, Maddy, and Roberti 
FEBRUARY 13, 1990 
Relative to the creation of the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and 
Revenue 
WHEREAS, In 1978, Californians enacted Proposition 13 which rolled back the 
assessed value of property to values established in the 1975-76 fiscal year 
limited growth in assessed value of property to 2 percent annually, require~ 
reassessment of property only upon change of ownership or new construction 
and limited property tax paid to 1 percent of full cash value; and ' 
WHEREAS, Since 1978, additional measures have been enacted which have 
further limited the circumstances in which reassessment may occur; and 
WHEREAS, The State of California is no longer in a period with unspent 
General Fund surpluses; and 
WHEREAS, The constitutionality of Proposition 13 is being challenged in 
three court cases, based on the recent United States Supreme Court decision, 
Allegheny Pitt. v. Webster Co., 488 u.s. (109 s. Ct. 633, 102 L. Ed. 2d 
688) which could result in the elimination of the assessment provision of 
Proposition 13; and 
WHEREAS, Immediately upon the passage of Proposition 13, disparities were 
recognized in the treatment of homeowners and commercial property owners in 
similar situations who had purchased homes at different time periods; and 
WHEREAS, This disparity has increased over time, as established property 
owners continue paying property taxes based on the 1975-76 value of their 
property, while new property owners pay taxes based on the recent market value 
of their property; and 
WHEREAS, California's system of tax assessments may result in property tax 
payments which fall heavily upon young families, many of whom already have 
difficulty in purchasing the median priced California home, which in the third 
quarter of 1989 sold for $200,933; and 
WHEREAS, Home ownership is one of the economic foundations of this state; 
and 
WHEREAS, Similar disparities have developed for commercial property whereby 
a change in ownership will dramatically change the competitive marketplace 
with no resulting benefit to the economy; and 
WHEREAS, Increased property tax burdens resulting from changes in ownership 
in rental properties often result in increased rents which create additional 
burdens on renters; and 
WHEREAS, California's local governments and public schools are directly 
affected by changes to the property taxation system; and 
WHEREAS, Prior to Proposition 13 local agencies had their own independent 
methods of financing local services; and 
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WHEREAS, The authority to finance those services has shifted to the state, 
causing local governments to lose the ability to deal with local problems; and 
WHEREAS, State programs and policies required to be implemented at the 
local level are consistently underfunded due to the lack of state and local 
resources; now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the Senate of the State of California, That the Senate 
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue is hereby created to study and 
analyze the current system of property taxation, and develop proposals for 
alternative methods of property taxation that maintain the basic protections 
for homeowners promulgated in Proposition 13, adequately fund the provision of 
essential public services by local government agencies, and reduce or 
eliminate inequities currently experienced by property taxpayers in 
California; and be it further 
Resolved, That the commission shall recommend new intergovernmental 
relationships which will more effectively allocate local and state financing 
power and authority. The commission shall also recommend a reallocation of 
public service responsibilities among local, state, and regional agencies; and 
be it further 
Resolved, That the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue 
shall include, but not be limited to, 15 members, all of whom shall be 
appointed by the Senate Rules Committee. Members of the commission shall 
include all of the following: 
(1) One representative of county government. 
(2) One representative of city government. 
(3) One representative of special district government. 
(4) one representative of school or community college district government. 
(5) one county assessor. 
(6) One legal scholar in the field of property taxation. 
(7) Three Members of the Senate. 
(8) Six public members; and be it further 
Resolved, That the senate Committee on Rules shall appoint one of the 
appointed members as Chair of the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and 
Revenue; and be it further 
Resolved, That the State Board of Equalization and the Franchise Tax Board 
shall provide technical assistance to the Senate Commission on Property Tax 
Equity and Revenue; and be it further 
Resolved, That the Sen~te Committee on Rules shall make funds available to 
the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue from the Senate 
Operating Fund in an amount that the Senate Committee on Rules finds to be 
necessary for the expenses of the commission in carrying out its duties. Any 
proposed expenditures of these funds shall be approved by, and be in 
compliance with policies set fo~th by, the Senate Committee on Rules; and be 
it further 
Resolved, That the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenues 
shall report its findings and recommendations to the Senate Committee on Rules 
no later than one year from the date of the appointment of the members of the 
commission; and be it further 
Resolved, That the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue 
shall cease to exist as of January 31, 1991; and be it further 
Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate shall transmit copies of this 
resolution to the Senate Committee on Rules, the League of California Cities, 
the County Supervisors Association of California, the California Special 
Districts Association, the California School Boards Association, the Franchise 
Tax Board, and the Chair of the State Board of Equalization. 
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SENATE RESOLUTION 8 (HART) 
----·----~ 
BILL TEXT 
INTRODUCED BY Senators Hart, Ayala, and Bergeson 
DECEMBER 4, 1990 
Relative to the continuation of the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity 
and Revenue 
WHEREAS, In 1978, Californians enacted Proposition 13 which rolled back the 
assessed value of property to values established in the 1975-76 fiscal year, 
limited growth in assessed value of property to 2 percent annually, required 
reassessment of property only upon purchase, change of ownership, or new 
construction, and limited property tax paid to 1 percent of full cash value; 
and 
WHEREAS, Since 1978, additional measures have been enacted which have 
further limited the circumstances in which reassessment may occur; and 
WHEREAS, The State of California is no longer in a period with unspent 
General Fund surpluses; and 
WHEREAS, The constitutionality of Proposition 13 is being challenged in 
three court cases, based on the United States Supreme Court decision, 
Allegheny Pitt. v. Webster co., 488 u.s. 336 (109 s. Ct. 633, 102 L. Ed. 2d 
688), which could result in the elimination of the assessment provision of 
Proposition 13; and 
WHEREAS, Immediately upon the passage of Proposition 13, disparities were 
recognized in the treatment of homeowners and commercial property owners in 
similar situations who had purchased homes at different time periods; and 
WHEREAS, This disparity has increased over time, as established property 
owners continue paying property taxes based on the 1975-76 value of their 
property, while new property owners pay taxes based on the recent market value 
of their property; and 
WHEREAS, California's system of tax assessments may result in property tax 
payments which fall heavily upon young families, many of whom already have 
difficulty in purchasing the median priced California home, which in the third 
quarter of 1989 sold for $200,933; and 
WHEREAS, Home ownership is one of the economic foundations of this state; 
and 
WHEREAS, Similar disparities have developed for commercial property whereby 
a change in ownership will dramatically change the competitive marketplace 
with no resulting benefit to the economy; and 
WHEREAS, Increased property tax burdens resulting from changes in ownership 
in rental properties often result in increased rents which create additional 
burdens on renters; and 
WHEREAS, California's local governments and public schools are directly 
affected by changes to the property taxation system; and 
WHEREAS, Prior to Proposition 13 local agencies had their own independent 
methods of financing local services; and 
WHEREAS, The authority to finance those services has shifted to the state, 
causing local governments to lose the ability to deal with local problems; and 
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WHEREAS, State programs and policies required to be implemented at the 
local level are consistently underfunded due to the lack of state and local 
resources; and 
WHEREAS, The Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue was 
created to study and analyze the current system of property taxation, and 
develop proposals for alternative methods of property taxation that maintain 
the basic protections for property owners promulgated in Proposition 13, 
adequately fund the provision of essential public services by local government 
agencies, and reduce or eliminate inequities currently experienced by property 
taxpayers in California; and 
WHEREAS, The commission has been empowered to recommend new 
intergovernmental relationships which will more effectively allocate local and 
state financing power and authority and to recommend a reallocation of public 
service responsibilities among local, state, and regional agencies; and 
WHEREAS, The Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue is 
required to report its findings and recommendations to the Senate Committee on 
Rules no later than one year from the date of the appointment of the members 
of the commission; and 
WHEREAS, The Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue shall 
cease to exist as of January 31, 1991, which does not allow sufficient time 
for completion of its important task; now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the Senate of the State of California, That the Senate 
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue continue in existence until June 
30, 1991, and as of that date shall cease to exist; and be it further 
Resolved, That the Senate Committee on Rules shall make funds available to 
the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue from the Senate 
Operating Fund in an amount that the Senate Committee on Rules finds to be 
necessary for the expenses of the commission in carrying out its duties. Any 
proposed expenditure of these funds shall be approved by, and be in compliance 
with policies set forth by, the Senate Committee on Rules; and be it further 
Resolved, That the Secretary of~the Senate shall transmit copies of this 
resolution to the League of California Cities, the County Supervisors 
Association of California, the California Special Districts Association, the 
California School Boards Association, the Franchise Tax Board, and the Chair 
of the State Board of Equalization. 
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APPENDIX C: 
SCHEDULE OF COMMISSION 
POLICY MEETINGS 
The Commission conducted six public meetings to receive testimony and options from tax 
experts, scholars, state and local officials and citizen organizations. 
June 25, 1990 
July 30, 1990 
August 27, 1990 
September 24, 1990 
November 14, 1990 
December 17, 1990 
Overview of Property Tax System 
Assessment Procedures 
Revenues 
Current Legal Issues 
Property Tax Equity 
Local ~vernment Finance 
School Finance 
Property Tax Equity Issues 
Equal Protection and Intergenerational Transfer 
Property Tax Incidence (Ability to Pay) 
Equitable Business Property Taxation 
Assessment Methods and Options 
Local Government and School Finance 
Local Fiscal Capacity 
Equalization of Local ~vernment Capacity 
Realignment of State/Local Program Responsibility 
AB 8 & Distributional Equity 
School Finance 
Property Tax Impact on Public Policy 
Fiscalization of Land Use 
Housing 
Agriculture 
Growth Management 
Local ~vernance 
Property Tax Systems: New Approaches, Options 
California Tax Reform Association Proposal 
Voter Revolt Proposal and Initiative 
Property Tax Systems: New Approaches, Options 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association Proposals 
(4 proposals developed by scholars at the request of the 
Jarvis Association) 
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